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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

case. If the judge determines that the evidence is relevant, he can enter
an order as to what part of the evidence may be introduced and the
exact questions to be permitted. The same procedure should be followed
when there are circumstances making specific acts of intercourse with others
relevant. Determining these issues initially out of the hearing of the jury
serves to insulate them from such prejudicial evidence in those cases where
it is ultimately determined to be inadmissible. Such a procedure would
more effectively enable Missouri courts to minimize psychological damage
to the victim and maximize protection to the defendant.
JOEL WILSON

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: THE CHANGING ROLE
OF THE RULE OF MUTUALITY
I. INTRODUCTION

The term res judicata traditionally refers to the effect given a prior
judgment in a later action between the same parties on the same cause
of action.' Professor Vestal has given this effect the more descriptive title
of "claim preclusion. ' 2 As a general rule, the plea of res judicata or claim
preclusion prevents the same parties or their privies from relitigating
the same cause of action and bars not only all the issues previously decided,
but also every matter which might have been offered and received to
sustain or defeat the claim.3
The term collateral estoppel refers to the effect given a prior adjudication in a second action based upon a different claim or cause of action.
Collateral estoppel is similar to res judicata in that its purpose is also the
prevention of relitigation. 4 It is, however, more limited than res judicata
because only those issues or facts actually litigated and determined in the
previous suit are precluded. 5 Professor Vestal describes this effect as "issue
preclusion." 6 At common law and in the majority of jurisdiction today,
the doctrine of collateral estoppel also requires that the parties to the
second action be the same as, or in privity with, the parties to the first
1.

RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

§ 45 (1942).

2. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IowA L. REv. 27
(1964) (hereinafter cited as Vestal).
3. Accord, Lovely v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d 1261 (lst Cir. 1974); Hauber v.
Halls Levee Dist., 497 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. 1973). See also R.ESTATMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
4. F. JAMES, CIVL PROCEDURE § 11.18 (1965).
5. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 .(1876); Stickle v. Link, 511
S.W.2d 848 (Mo. 1974). As a general rule, default judgments will not be given
collateral estoppel effect. Contra, Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors, Ltd.,
375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Braxton v. Litchalk, 55 Mich. App. 708, 223
N.W.2d 316 (1974).
6. See Vestal, supra note 2, at 28.
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action. 7 This requirement is generally denominated as the rule of mutuality.
This comment will discuss the circumstances and factors that have led
some courts to abandon the rule of mutuality.
II.

MUTUALrry

Mutuality is often defined as requiring that a litigant will not be
allowed to benefit from a prior adjudication, unless the facts are such that
he would have been bound by the prior adjudication if it had been the
other way.8 Because only parties or their privies could be bound by a
prior adjudication, 9 mutuality requires that only they may benefit from
one.
Because the rule of mutuality focuses attention upon who may be
bound by an adjudication, a general discussion of that subject is necessary.
In general, persons who are named as parties to an action and properly
brought before the court will be bound by the judgment and thus subject
to the res judicata or collateral estoppel effects of that action. Similarly,
persons in privity with named parties will be bound. Persons considered
to be in privity are those who control an action although not a named
party,1° those whose interests are represented by a party to the action, 11
and successors in interest of a party.1 2 Such persons are considered bound
by the prior judgment and therefore a plea of res judicata or collateral
estoppel may be asserted against them. Likewise, because they would be
bound if the judgment is against their interest, they may reap the benefits
of a favorable prior judgment in future litigation against other parties
or privies. Two examples will illustrate the effect of this rule:
7. See, e.g., Orton v. Cheatham, 309 So. 2d 94 (Ala. 1975); Cowan v. Insurance Co. North America, 22 Ill. App. 3d 883, 318 N.E.2d 315 (1974); Keith
v. Schiefen-Stockham Ins. Agency, 209 Kan. 537, 498 P.2d 265 (1972); Howell v.
Vito's Trucking & Excavating Co., 386 Mich. 37, 191 N.W.2d 313 (1971); Wright
v. Holt, 18 N.C. App. 661, 197 S.E.2d 811 (1973); Armstrong v. Miller, 200
N.W.2d 282 (N.D. 1972); Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108,
254 N.E.2d 10 (1969); Daigneau v. National Cash Register Co., 247 So. 2d 465
(Fla. App. 1971); Lukacs v. Kluessner, 290 N.E.2d 125 (Ind. App. 1972); Stillpass
v. Kenton Co. Airport Bd., 403 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. App. 1966); Trahan v. Liberty
Mutual Ins., 303 So. 2d 606 (La. App. 1974); Booth v. Kirk, 381 S.W.2d 312
(Tenn. App. 1963). See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942); 1 FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTs § 2428 (5th ed. 1925); lB J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE fr 0.411 (1) (1965).
Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REv. 25, 38-46 (1965).
8. See authorities cited note 7 supra.
9. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat.
Trust & Say. Ass'n., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942) (dictum).
10. See Wells v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 459 S.W.2d 253 (Mo.
En Banc 1970); REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTs § 84 (1942).
11. Accord, Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1901);
United States v. Burlington Truck Line, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 582 (W.D. Mo. 1973);
City of Montgomery v. Newson, 469 S.W.2d 54 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971); RESrATE-.
MENT OF JUDGMENTS § 85 (1942).
12. See generally North Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.
Supp. 1217 (W.D. Mo. 1974); Mathison v. Public Water Supply District, 401
S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1966); F. JAmEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.30 (1965); RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS § 89 (1942).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/3
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(1) First action: Plaintiff v. Defendant-judgment for Plaintiff.
Second action: Plaintiff v. Z-because Z was not a party to the
first action, and assuming he was not in privity
with Defendant, due process' 8 prohibits use of
the prior judgment in the action against Z.
(2) First action: Plaintiff v. Defendant-judgment for Defendant.
Second action: Plaintiff v. Z-Z wants to use the prior judgment
against Plaintiff as a defense. Strict application
of the rule of mutuality prohibits Z from using
the prior judgment, because Z would not have
been bound if the judgment in the first action
had been for Plaintiff (see example 1).
The law, however, could not tolerate a doctrine as rigid as mutuality,
and a series of exceptions were soon recognized. One of the earliest exceptions arose where an initial action between a creditor and a principal
debtor resulted in exoneration of the debtor on nonpersonal grounds. In
the creditor's subsequent action against the surety, the surety, not a party
to the first action, was allowed to use the judgment exonerating the principal debtor as a conclusive defense.' 4 This avoids the anomalous possibility of a judgment against a surety who will either have no indemnity
against his principal, or, if he has, then the principal will be directly
subjected to a liability from which he has been legally discharged.
The courts have extended this exception to vicarious liability cases.
Here, the liability of the master is totally dependent upon the culpability
of his servant. If the servant has been exonerated in a prior suit by the
same plaintiff and based upon the same facts, then the master can use
the prior judgment as a bar to the suit against him.' 5 The justification
for the exception to mutuality is that one who is liable only for the acts

of another should not be liable where the other has been legally exonerated.
Accordingly, the plea is usually allowed in cases "where the relationship
betwveen the defendants in the two suits has been that of principal and
agent, master and servant or indemnitor and indemnitee."' 6
The Restatement of Judgments recognizes these two exceptions, 17 but
does not recognize an exception for the converse situation where an employee attempts to rely on a judgment exonerating his employer on the
negligence issue. The Restatement's position is based on the lack of reverse
indemnification. Nevertheless, some courts have extended the exception
to this situation in spite of the lack of indemnification.' 8
Where courts want to avoid the problem of mutuality and its excep13. See text accompanying notes 19-23 infra.
14. See Lamb v. Wahlenmaier, 144 Cal. 91, 77 P. 765 (1904); Gill v. Morris,
58 Tenn. 500 (1872).
15. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S.
111 (1912).
16. Id. at 128.
17. RESTATUNaENT OF JUDGMENns §§ 96-97 (1942).
18. Davis v. Perryman, 225 Ark. 963, 286 S.W.2d 844 (1956); Giedrewicz v.
Donovan, 277 Mass. 563, 179 N.E. 246 (1932).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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tions, they may embark on a judicial hunt for metaphysical privity. 10
This is seldom useful and often confusing because privity is ordinarily
limited to non-parties who are bound by a judgment. The suggestion that
a non-party, who would not otherwise be bound by a judgment, might
still be in privity for the purpose of asserting a judgment gives the word
different and confusing meanings.
The rule that only parties or their privies may be bound by a judgment is rooted in due process requirements. The United States Supreme
Court has stated:
The doctrine of res judicata rests at bottom upon the ground
that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in
privity, has litigated or had an opportunity to litigate the same
matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction....
The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite of due process
of law in judicial- proceedings .... So [a state] cannot, without
disregarding the requirements of due process, give a conclusive
effect to a prior judgment against
one who is neither a party nor
in privity with a party thereiri.20
The notion that a person may not constitutionally be bound by a prior
judgment to which he was neither a party nor a privity with a party
appears to be firmly established. Several recent cases, however, appear
not to accept this view, at least not without some limitation. In Cauefield v.
Fidelity and Castalty Company,21 a suit was brought in a Louisiana state
court against the defendant for cemetery desecration. A judgment was
rendered for the defendant. Subsequently, a different plaintiff filed suit
in federal court against the same defendant, alleging the same cause of
action based on the 'same facts. The district court sustained the plea of
collateral estoppel on: the issue of desecration. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, noting that the applicable
state law did not require a finding of desecration of a particular grave,
but only desecration of any part of the cemetery. The previous judgment
had established that there 'was no desecration of any part of the cemetery
and the second plaintiff was properly denied an opportunity to relitigate.
The court of appeals also noted that both plaintiffs were represented by
the same attorney, that the second plaintiff testified at the first trial,
and that the second plaintiff admitted that no new evidence would be
introduced at the second trial.
In Roode v. Michaelian,22 a teacher claimed to have been dismissed

because of union activity and filed a charge with the Westchester County
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). A hearing was held and
. 19. In Makariw v. Rinard, 222 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1963), privity was
seemingly expanded to its constitutional limits when the court held an employee
was in privity with his employer and therefore bound by an adverse judgment
against his employer even though the employee's estate had never had an opportunity to litigate the issue of his negligence.
20. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918).
21. 378 F.2d. 876 (5th Cir. 1967).
22. 373 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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the hearing examiner found that the plaintiff's charges were not supported by the evidence. However, an administrative review board found
that the plaintiff was at least in part dismissed because of union activity.
PERB issued an order directing that the plaintiff be reinstated with back
pay, but the school district refused to comply. PERB then commenced a
statutory action in a New York state court to enforce its order. The teacher
sought leave to intervene. The court denied intervention and only allowed
the teacher to file an amicus curiae brief. The state court refused to
enforce PERB's order as unsupported by the evidence. No appeal was
taken. The teacher then filed a civil rights suit in federal court, alleging
that the defendant school district refused to rehire her because of union
activities. The defendant pleaded the prior state court action (in which
the plaintiff was denied intervention) as a bar to the plaintiff's federal
court action. The district court allowed the plea, saying: "Having once
had her day in court, plaintiff is not entitled to relitigate the factual
issue determined against her before the hearing examiner and the [state
court]. '" 2 3 It is difficult to determine which prior litigation was deemed
to preclude the plaintiff from relitigating her dismissal. The hearing
examiner who decided against her was reversed by the administrative
review board, and she was denied intervention in the state court action.
The court was probably not saying that the filing of the amicus curiae
brief constitutes sufficient participation to be bound by a decision. The
decision may be justified on the ground that the plaintiff was in privity
with PERB, and PER.B's suit adequately represented her interests in the
state court. In such a case, the plaintiff was not unconstitutionally bound
because of the privity relationship.
Gerrard v. Larsen24 involved a two car collision in which one driver
was killed. A passenger in decedent's automobile brought a personal injury
action against the other driver, who in turn filed a third party complaint
against decedent's administrator seeking contribution. The administrator
filed a counterclaim for wrongful death which was severed for trial.
The main action resulted in a finding that the decedent was negligent.
When the severed counterclaim came to trial, it was dismissed due to
the previous finding that decedent was negligent. The administrator
represented the decedent's estate on the contribution claim, but represented the decedent's parents on the wrongful death counterclaim. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that ordinarily
only parties or their privies may be bound by a judgment and acknowledged that the parents were not parties or in privity with a party in the
main action. However, the court, relying on the Cauefield decision, stated
that in light of the changing applications of the concepts of res judicata

and collateral estoppel, the question of who should be bound by a prior
adjudication ought to be resolved on a case by case basis, rather than by
relying solely upon the formal status of persons against whom an estoppel
23. Id. at 56.
24. 517 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1975).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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is asserted. The court reversed and remanded to the trial court for a determination whether the parents had participated sufficiently in the main
action to be bound thereby, based on what the court referred to as "functional privity" with the decedent's estate.
These cases seem to be proceeding on a case by case analysis of the
particular facts to determine if there is any equitable reason to allow an
issue previously litigated, regardless of by whom, to be relitigated. On
the other hand, similar results could have been obtained by applying an
expansive interpretation to traditional privity concepts which some of
these decisions may have covertly employed. By either approach, these
three cases may be interpreted as a trend away from the mechanical due
process requirement that only parties or persons traditionally defined
as privies may be bound by a judgment. The Supreme Court itself has
even indicated that a failure to intervene when it is convenient to do so
may result in the decision being binding on the non-intervenor. 25
It is essential to note, however, that two separate and distinct considerations present themselves when one is attempting to classify the
effects of a valid judgment: (1) who is bound by the judgment? and (2)
who may utilize the benefits of the judgment? Even if the answer to the
first question is that a judgment is binding only on the parties and their
privies because of due process, the answer to the second question is not
necessarily the same. If the party against whom the plea is asserted was
either a prior party or in privity, the question of who may assert the plea
does not seem to involve due process questions. The person seeking to
relitigate an issue has had his constitutionally-required day in court on
that issue and lost. The person seeking preclusion is willing to forego
his right to a day in court on the issue. Nevertheless, most courts have
ignored this distinction and utilized the rule of mutuality to limit those
persons who may assert the plea of collateral estoppel, as well as those
persons against whom it may be asserted.
III. TmB ASSAULT ON MUTUALTY
In recent years widespread dissatisfaction with the rule of mutuality2
has led several state courts2 7 to abandon or modify it. Some federal courts
28
have perhaps abandoned it, at least with regard to federal questions.
25. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102,
114 (1968).
26. Jeremy Bentham, a nineteenth century utilitarian, criticized mutuality
as unfounded in reason and a "maxim which one would suppose to have found

its way from the gaming table to the bench." J. BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial
Evidence, in 7 WoRxs OF JEREmy BmNTHAAM 171 (Bowring ed. 1843).
27. See, e.g., B. R. Dewitt, Inc. v. Hall, 225 N.E.2d 195, 19 N.Y.2d 141 (N.Y.
App. 1967) (declaring mutuality a "dead letter" in New York); Spettigue v.
Mahoney, 445 P.2d 557 (Ariz. App. 1968) (refusing to abolish mutuality where
prior judgment used offensively).
28. Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 515 (E.D.
Mich. 1974). See also Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 827
F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
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There does not appear to be a constitutional prohibition against allowing
a prior judgment to be subsequently pleaded by a non-party to the initial
action. Therefore, each state is free to retain or abolish the requirement
of mutuality.2 9
The proponents of the rule of mutuality defend the rule as a reflection of the inherently personal nature of an in personam judgment.30
This argument centers around the fact that at the heart of our judicial
system is an understanding that litigation is essentially personal; the
parties meet in court to resolve disputes. Our judicial system makes a
distinction between actions in rem-designed and intended to be binding
upon the whole world-and those actions in personam-personal and
private between the parties and of no concern to the world at large.3 1
To allow a person to reap the benefits of a personal judgment to which
he was not a party would disrupt these traditional concepts. Parties to
a lawsuit could no longer resolve differences between themselves presently
without fear that future changed circumstances might turn victory into
defeat at the hands of an unknown non-party lurking in the distance. A
non-party would have the luxury of using a judgment from which he
can benefit with the confidence that due process would not allow that
judgment to be used against him.3 2 If an individual is to be granted his
day in court, fairness requires that he must know against whom he labors
and that he be afforded the opportunity to confront personally those to
whom he will be bound if he should lose. Additionally, even if a party

is aware of the number of his potential adversaries, every lawsuit is unique
as to startegy, tactics, admissible evidence, and the ever-present and unpredictable jury. Other arguments in favor of the rule of mutuality point

to the fallibility of the jury system33 and the dangers of a sympathetic
plaintiff,

action,

0

4

compromise verdicts,5 incompetency of counsel in the previous

and newly-discovered evidence.37

29. Mackis v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968); Graves v. Associated
Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965).
30. Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TuLANE
L. Rzv. 301 (1961); Note, Mutuality of Estoppel: McCourt v. Algiers in Context,

1967 Wis. L. REv. 267.
31. RESATEMENT

OF JurGMENTS,

General Principles, ch. 1 (1942).

32. Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties,68 CoLUm.

L. RFv. 1457 (1968).
33. Spettigue v. Mahoney, 445 P.2d 557, 562 (Ariz. App. 1968); Hornstein v.
Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, 133 F.2d 143, 145 (3rd Cir. 1943).
34. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957). Currie later withdrew his objections in Civil Procedure, The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. Rxv. 25 (1965).

35. Bener v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532, 542 (2d
Cir. 1965); Taylor v. Hawkinson, 47 Cal. 2d 893, 896, 306 P.2d 797, 799 (1957);
Leipert v. Honold, 39 Cal. 2d 462, 468, 247 P.2d 324, 329 (1952).
36. Contra, Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 901 (4th
Cir. 1965).
37. United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 728 (D. Nev.
1962) (argument considered). Contra, Pat Perusse Realty Co. v. Lingo, 238 A.2d
100 (Md. App. 1968).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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In addition, proponents of the rule allege that the policies underlying res judicata-i.e., bringing an end to litigation 3s and preventing harrassing multiple suits,3 9 would not be served if non-parties are allowed to
make use of a prior judgment because: (1) If a party knows that nonparties will be able to use the judgment in a subsequent suit, it may
increase litigation because he may litigate longer and more thoroughly
than the issue initially warrants 40 and (2) there is no harrassment because
the party faced with relitigation of an issue is the one who desires to
relitigate the issue. 41 Also if the rule of mutuality is abandoned, interested
persons may refuse to intervene in present actions, because they know
if their adversary wins, the judgment may not be used against them,
whereas if their adversary loses, they will be able to utilize the judgment
later. Thus the abandonment of mutuality would encourage potential
litigants to adopt a "wait and see" attitude.
The main argument against the rule of mutuality is the need to
improve judicial efficiency by cutting down on the flood of cases now
reaching the courts.42 It is argued that a party who has had his day in
court on an issue should not be entitled to relitigate that issue as many
times as he may have adversaries. The opponents of mutuality also stress
the rule's lack of a rational basis, in that the considerations involved in
deciding who may be bound by a prior determination of an issue are
completely unrelated to those considerations involved in deciding against
whom a prior determination may be asserted. Additionally, due to the
possibility of different results on identical facts, opponents contend that
mutuality produces a loss of public respect for the judiciary. 48
In Bernhard v. Bank of America, 44 the leading case abandoning the

rule of mutuality, Chief Justice Traynor stated:
The criteria for determining who may assert a plea of res
judicata differ fundamentally from the criteria for determining
against whom a plea of res judicata may be asserted. The requirements of due process of law forbid the assertion of a plea of res
judicata against a party unless he was bound by the earlier litigation in which the matter was decided....
There is no compelling reason, however, for requiring that
the party asserting the plea of res judicata must have been a party,
or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation.
No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality....
In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three ques38. See Tillman v. National City Bank, 118 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 650 (1941).
39. See Kithcart v. Metropolitan Life, 119 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1941).
40. Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TULANu
L. R.v. 301 (1961); Semmel, CollateralEstoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties,
68 COLuM. L. REv. 1457 (1968).
41. See Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 872 F.2d 969

(Ct. CI. 1967); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. Rnv. 281 (1957). Contra, Bahler v. Fletcher, 474 P.2d 829,
335 (Ore. 1970).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/3

8

1976]

Cunningham: Cunningham: Collateral Estoppel: the Changing Role of the Rule of Mutuality
COLLA TERAL ESTOPPEL

tions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in question? Was
there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against whom
the plea is asserted
a party or in privity with a party to the prior
45
adjudication?
Nearly all courts have expressly added a fourth requirement to Chief
Justice Traynor's test-that the defendant (or person against whom the
plea is asserted) has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue
in the first proceeding. 46 Technically, this fourth requirement is redundant,
because issue preclusion has always incorporated this inquiry, even where
the same parties are involved in both law suits. 47 Realistically, however,
the fourth requirement is useful because it forces a court to examine
carefully the facts that constitute a full and fair opportunity to litigate.
IV. A FULL AND FAR OPPORTUNITY To LITIGATE
The problem facing courts today is that mutuality is still being
viewed as an all-or-nothing proposition; that is, either mutuality is always
required or it is never required. This is unfortunate because there are
certain situations where the requirement of mutuality no longer performs
a useful function and may be patently unfair. However, there are also
situations where the abolition of mutuality would work an unfair result
upon a party. It is this writer's contention that mutuality should no longer
be viewed as a condition precedent to allowing a plea of collateral estoppel
by a non-party to the prior adjudication. Rather, courts should proceed
on a case by case basis and consider the particular facts of each case in
determining whether mutuality should be required. Most of the courts that
have abandoned the rule of mutuality have established a "full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the first suit" as the standard for
determining when to allow a plea of collateral estoppel by a non-party

to the prior adjudication. The remainder of this section will address
itself to the factors to be considered in deciding when a party has been
afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in the prior action.

42. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.

313 (1971).

43. Berhard v. Bank of Am. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892

(1942).
44. Id. In the first suit, a beneficiary of the decedent's estate objected to
the omission in the executor's final account of a deposit of money in a certain
California bank. The executor's defense was that the deposit was a gift to himself
made by the decedent during her lifetime, and the finding of a gift was sustained.
Later the beneficiary sued the bank for the unauthorized release of the deposit
and the bank sought to use the probate court's judgment as conclusive on the
issue of gift, although the bank was a non-party to that prior adjudication.
45. Id. at 894-95.
46. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944 (2d
Cir. 1964); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev.
1962).
47. F. JANIES, CIVIL PROCEDUR § 11.19 (1965).
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There are basically four situations that will arise if mutuality is no
longer considered an essential requirement in allowing a plea of collateral
estoppel:
1. Losing plaintiff in first suit is plaintiff in second suit.
2. Losing defendant in first suit is plaintiff in second suit.
3. Losing plaintiff in first suit is defendant in second suit.
4. Losing defendant in first suit is defendant in second suit.
These four situations will be analyzed by examining the factors that
should influence the courts in deciding whether mutuality should be
required.
A. Losing Plaintiff in First Suit Is Plaintiff in Second Suit
This situation arises where a plaintiff sues a defendant in one suit,
and the defendant is victorious. The same plaintiff subsequently sues a
different defendant, alleging the same cause of action based on the same
transaction as his prior suit. The second defendant pleads the prior judgment as a bar. The plea of collateral estoppel by the defendant in the
second action is a defensive use of the first judgment to defeat plaintiff's
attempt to change defendants and relitigate an issue found against him
in the first action. This is the traditional situation where courts have
found "exceptions" to the requirement of mutuality and is probably the
easiest in which to justify allowing a plea of collateral estoppel by a nonparty to the prior litigation. The plaintiff initiated the first action against
the defendant and presumably picked the most convenient forum and
presented his best and most convicing evidence. It is also quite possible
that the plaintiff could have joined the second defendant in the initial
action and avoided the second suit completely. Absent extraordinary circumstances, there is little reason to allow the plaintiff the opportunity to
pick and choose among the possible defendants and sue each separately
in hopes of eventually finding a kindly or confused jury.
In Sanderson v. Balfour4 s Sanderson was operating a tractor which
collided with a parked car. When sued by the owner of the car for property
damage, Sanderson counterclaimed for personal injuries. 49 A jury found
for the owner on his claim and against Sanderson on his counterclaim.
Sanderson then brought a second action for personal injuries against the
bailee of the car (the owner's wife) who had parked it near the highway.
The trial court denied the bailee's motion to dismiss. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the trial court and dismissed the action,

saying that the plaintiff had had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the prior action.
48. 109 N.H. 205, 247 A.2d 185 (1968).
49. When a defendant counterclaims, for purposes of this comment, he will

be treated as the plaintiff with respect to that counterclaim. When a jurisdiction
has a compulsory counterclaim rule, courts should consider the inconvenience
of the forum and the availability of the witnesses in that jurisdiction when they
consider whether he was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/3
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In PatPerusee Realty Co. v. Lingo5O a broker sued a husband and wife
(sellers) for a commission he alleged to be due and owing. Only the husband
was served with process and the jury verdict was in favor of the husband,
because no willing purchaser had been found. The broker then brought
attachment (garnishment?) against a debtor of the wife. The wife pleaded
the prior judgment. The trial court held for the wife, saying that she
would have been bound by the judgment even though she was never
served or appeared, because she had notice and could have defended.
The appellate court decided that regardless of whether the wife was bound,
Maryland had abandoned mutuality and allowed the prior judgment to
be pleaded despite the fact that the broker argued he could establish a
better case against the wife than against the husband. The court came
perilously dose to sanctioning a "one chance in court is all you get"
approach that can be even more unfair than mutuality. The broker obviously had difficulty getting service of process on the wife in the first
action, but prosecuted the action even though she was the moving force
behind the sale transaction. Had the broker realized that an adverse judgment in the suit against the husband would bar a later action against
the wife, he might well have dismissed the first action. This arguably
unfair result shows that the reliance on past decisions by the practicing
bar is a factor to be considered when a jurisdiction decides to abandon
mutuality. 51
In Pennington v. Snow52 a husband, wife, and the estate of their
deceased child sued the owner and driver of a vehicle involved in a collision with a car driven by the husband. The plaintiffs claimed damages
of $175,000, alleging that defendants' negligence caused the wife's miscarriage. While that suit was pending in superior court, the husband
sued his insurer for medical payments of $2,500 in a state district court
of limited jurisdiction. The state district court action was the first to
come to trial and the court found that the wife's miscarriage was not
causally connected to the accident. When the superior court action came
to trial the defendants moved for summary judgment due to the lack of
a causal connection between the accident and the miscarriage. The
Supreme Court of Alaska abandoned mutuality as a requirement of collateral estoppel and adopted the Bernhard rationale of proceeding on a
case by case basis. The court thoroughly examined the facts to determine
whether the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue in a second
action had in fact had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue
in the first action. In this case the court decided that there was not a
full and fair opportunity to litigate, because the first judgment was in
a court of limited jurisdiction for a small sum, whereas the second action
was in a court of general jurisdiction for $175,000. The district court was
50. 249 Md. 33, 238 A.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1968).
51. Continental Can Co. v. Hudson Foam Latex Prod., Inc., 123 N.J. Super.
364, 303 A.2d 97 (Law Div. 1973), rev'd, 129 N.J. Super. 426, 324 A.2d 60 (1974).
52. 471 P.2d 370 (Alas. 1970).
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certainly not the forum the plaintiffs would have chosen as the most
appropriate for a conclusive adjudication of this crucial issue, and plaintiffs
certainly expended less time and preparation on the relatively minor district court suit. The dissent agreed with the abolition of mutuality, but
would have given preclusive effect to the district court's finding of fact.68
In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation54 the Supreme Court of the United States allowed the defensive use
of a prior judgment by a non-party to the prior litigation against the
plaintiff in the prior patent litigation. The Court overruled all previous
authority that a patentee could not be collaterally estopped from relitigating his patent's validity. The Court paid particular attention to the prohibitive costs involved in patent infringement defenses and the likelihood
that such prohibitive costs will result in settlement rather than litigation,
even if the allegations of infringement are frivolous. The Supreme Court
rejected the strict rule of mutuality, but also rejected a strict rule of no
relitigation. Instead, the Court placed upon the patentee, who had previously lost a decision holding his patent invalid, the burden of showing a
need to relitigate its validity because he had not had a fair opportunity
procedurally, substantively, or evidentially to pursue his claim in the first
action. 5 The Court recognized that the decision whether to allow the
relitigation of the validity of a patent previously held invalid will necessarily rest on the trial court's sense of justice and equity. The Court
rejected the argument that its holding would merely shift the focus of
litigation from the merits of infringement to whether the party to be
estopped has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim.
B. Losing Defendant in First Suit Is Plaintiff in Second Suit
The second category where a party to a prior adjudication may
subsequently be met with a defense of that prior judgment arises where
a defendant loses in the first suit, and later brings his own action based
on, or involving, issues decided in the first suit. This problem arises
most often in jurisdictions having no compulsory counterclaim requirement or in cases where the compulsory counterclaim rule is inoperative
on the facts.
One commentator has said that refusing to give preclusive effect
to the prior judgment is justified in this situation, because the defendant
in the first action (the party to be estopped in the second action) was
53. Id. at 379.

54. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).

55. Placing the burden of proof upon the party against whom the prior
judgment is pleaded to refute the fact that he had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue in the first suit seems appropriate. The party asserting the
plea has the burden to show that the issue in question in the second action is
identical to the issue previously determined adversely to the other party in the
prior, valid, and binding judgment. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d
65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 722, 246 N.E.2d 722 (1969); Bahler v. Fletcher, 474 P.2d 329
(Ore. 1970). Contra, Waitkus v. Pomeroy, 31 Colo. App. 396, 506 P.2d 392 (1972),

rev'd on other grounds, 183 Colo. 344, 517 P.2d 396 (1974).
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forced into a court that was not of his own choosing and which may have
been inconvenient, thus preventing the prior defendant from putting
forth his best efforts. 56 No court has accepted this distinction 57 and one
court effectively criticized it, stating: "There would be something radically
wrong with our system of justice if we were required to start basing
rules of law upon the proposition that defendants do not on the average
58
have a fair opportunity to litigate relevant issues."
This situation frequently arises where a third party is used to finance
an undertaking. In Bahler v. Fletcher59 a homeowner contracted with a
builder to remodel his house. The builder assigned the contract and deed
of trust to a lender to raise funds to pay for the cost of materials. The
assignment was subject to a warranty that the work be done in a workmanlike manner. The homeowner refused to pay for the remodeling,
alleging that it was not performed in a workmanlike manner. The lender
then sued the builder to recover its money and return the contract and
deed of trust to the builder, resulting in judgment for the lender based
on the breach of warranty. The builder then sued the homeowner to
foreclose the deed of trust and the homeowner pleaded the prior judgment between the builder and his lender. The builder argued for mutuality,
claiming that if the builder had prevailed in the prior action, the deter-

mination of the quality of workmanship would not have been binding
on the homeowner. The Oregon court rejected mutuality as being irrelevant
to the question whether the defendant had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue. The court said that once such an opportunity has
been afforded, the defendant was bound by the determination. In an
extended opinion, the court considered many factors and concluded it
would not be unfair to allow collateral estoppel under the facts presented. The court adopted a two-part test for determining when the use
of collateral estoppel by a non-party in the first suit would be allowed:
(1) the identical issue must have been necessarily decided in a prior action
and be decisive of the present action; and (2) a full and fair opportunity
to contest the decision must have been afforded in the prior action. The
Oregon court appears to have added a new requirement by saying that
the issue to be precluded must be decisive to the subsequent action. This
presumably would make collateral estoppel inapplicable to unnecessary
or secondary issues previously litigated. Unfortunately, the court has not
given further guidance as to how "decisive" the issue must be in subsequent suits.60
Graves v. Assoc. Transport, Inc.61 involved a collision between a car
56. See Currie, supra note 34, at 300-04.
57. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 606-07, 25
Cal. Rptr. 559, 561, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962). See also Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,
Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 955-56, (2d Cir. 1964).
58. Bahler v. Fletcher, 474 P.2d 329, 337 (Ore. 1970).
59. Id.
60. But see In re Estate of Ellis, 333 A.2d 728, 731 n.8 (Pa. 1975).
61. 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965).
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and a truck. The driver of the car sued the owner of the truck for injuries
and property damage in a federal court. While that case was pending,
the truck driver sued the driver of the car in a Virginia state court for
injuries, claiming damages of $2,000. The state court suit came to trial
first and resulted in a judgment for the truck driver. When the motorist's
case came to trial the motorist recovered a judgment for $4,000. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the second
judgment, concluding that the state court judgment precluded the relitigation of negligence. Although the facts themselves would fall within
the common law exception to mutuality because of the indemnity relationship, the court of appeals preferred to speculate that Virginia would
abandon mutuality when presented with the opportunity and based its
decision on its finding that the motorist had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the negligence issue in the prior action. The court so found in
spite of the facts that the motorist filed his claim first, that the motorist's
claim was twice the amount of the claim it defended against, and that
the motorist was represented by his insurance carrier's attorney in the prior
action, whereas the motorist retained his own counsel in the federal suit.
It is highly unlikely that either party to the state court action realized
the judgment rendered there would be given such conclusive effect in
the suit still pending in federal court.
C. Losing Plaintiff in First Suit Is Defendant in Second Suit
The third situation where collateral estoppel problems may arise
is where a plaintiff loses in the first suit. The prior judgment is then
pleaded by a non-party to the prior litigation to establish affirmatively
the prior plaintiff's liability in the second suit. This use of collateral
estoppel differs dramatically from the first two situations because the plea
is not being utilized to defend or defeat a claim without relitigation,
rather, the plea is utilized to establish a claim without litigation.
Several commentators and courts have seized upon this distinction
as a rule of thumb as to when to allow or deny the plea of collateral
estoppel by a non-party to the prior action.0 2 This rule of thumb has
been rejected by most courts,03 but can be of some benefit in analyzing
the cases.
62. See Rawls v. Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul, Inc., 491 F.2d
141 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1975); Herzbrun v. Milwaukee
County, 504 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1973); Spettigue v. Mahoney, 445 P.2d 557 (Ariz.
App. 1968); Adamson v. Hall, 202 Kan. 482, 449 P.2d 536 (1969) (dictum); Continental Can Co. v. Hudson Foam Latex Prod., Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 364, 303
A.2d 97 (Law Div. 1973). See generally Currie, supra note 32; Comment, The
Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1010 (1967).
63. Popp v. Eberlein, 409 F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1969); Ford Motor Co. v.
Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 3d 442, 94 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1971); Ellis v. Crockett,
451 P.2d 814 (Hawaii 1969); Paradise Palms Comm. Ass'n v. Paradise Homes,
505 P.2d 596 (Nev. 1973); Bahler v. Fletcher, 474 P.2d 329 (Ore. 1970).
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Hardware Mutual Insurance Co. v. Valentine6 4 demonstrates that the
offensive use of prior judgments by non-parties may sometimes be appropriate. A fire in a hotel resulted in damage to the hotel and to the
property of a tenant in whose premises the fire occurred. The hotel's
fire insurance carrier sued the tenant, and while that suit was pending,

the tenant filed a separate suit against the contractor of the hotel, alleging
negligence in repairing the electrical system. The latter suit was tried
first and resulted in a judicial finding of fact that the fire was caused

by the tenant's negligent use of a hot plate. The insurance company then

moved for summary judgment in its action against the tenant on the
basis of the prior judgment. The motion was granted and affirmed on

appeal. There seems to be no reason why the tenant, having fully litigated
the issue of his negligence with knowledge of the pending insurer's action
and making no attempt to consolidate the cases, should be permitted to
relitigate. Where the party against whom collateral estoppel is used was
the plaintiff in the prior suit and chose the forum, it is difficult to argue
that he was denied the opportunity to present his best and most con-

vincing case.
This situation seldom arises due to the widespread use of general
verdicts. When a general verdict for a defendant is returned, it is seldom
evident why the jury decided against the plaintiff. For example, in a
negligence action arising from an automobile collision, a jury verdict
for the defendant could mean that the defendant was not negligent, that
there was no proximate cause, or that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. In such a case, even jurisdictions that have abandoned mutuality
would not allow a subsequent plaintiff to use the judgment to establish
a claim against the plaintiff in the first suit.
D. Losing Defendant in First Suit Is Defendant in Second Suit

The fourth situation where a non-party to a prior suit will attempt
to utilize that judgment arises where a defendant who lost in the first
suit is subsequently sued by new plaintiffs with claims arising from the
same occurrence or transaction that was previously litigated. This is the
area where courts and commentators are loath to allow the plea of collateral estoppel by persons not a party to the prior litigation.65 The fear
of allowing the plea in this situation is based on the facts that the defendant
in the first suit had no choice of forum and probably did not have the
right to join potential plaintiffs with similar claims. Moreover, the defendant will be denied the opportunity to confront those "sideline" plaintiffs who would benefit if he loses, but would not be bound if he prevails
in the first action.
These factors are compounded in Professor Currie's "chamber of
64. 119 Cal. App. 2d 125, 259 P.2d 70 (1953).
65. See Continental Can Co. v. Hudson Foam Latex Prod., Inc., 123 N.J.

Super. 364, 303 A.2d 97 (Law Div. 1973); In re Estate of Ellis, 333 A.2d 728, 731
n.7 (Pa. 1975).
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horrors" example of the "mass tort."6 6 Currie hypothesized a train wreck
where fifty passengers were injured, allegedly as a result of the railroad's
negligence. Passenger #1 sues and loses. Passenger #2, who has a due
process right to relitigate the railroad's negligence, sues the railroad, but
loses also. Similarly, Passengers #3 through #25 lose in individual suits.
For some reason, however, Passenger #26 obtains a verdict against the
defendant railroad. If Passengers #27 through #50 rely on Passenger
#26's judgment to prevent the railroad from relitigating the issue of its
negligence, only their individual damages remain to be decidedl The
possibility of such an anomolous result led Professor Currie to say that
collateral estoppel should not be allowed in such a situation, even if
the defendant lost in the first suit instead of the twenty-fifth. The benefits
to be derived by a "sideline" plaintiff certainly could result in encouraging a "wait and see" attitude in potential plaintiffs and discourage intervention and class actions.
In this day of mass transit and worldwide marketing of products, the
possibility of multiple plaintiffs has become a reality. The federal courts
were presented with the problem in 1958 when a United Air Lines passenger
plane collided with an Air Force jet over Nevada, killing all 42 passengers
and five crewmen of the airliner and the two Air Force pilots. 7 Suits
were filed in eleven different jurisdictions, with twenty-four suits brought
in the District Court for the Southern District of California and consolidated for trial. This consolidated lawsuit was the first to come to trial
and resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiffs on the issue of negligence.
Nine cases were pending in Nevada and the plaintiffs there moved for
summary judgment on the issue of liability based on the conclusiveness
of the California judgment. The court granted the motion, rejecting both
the rule of mutuality and Professor Currie's "mass tort" rationale. Instead,
the court only examined the question whether United Air Lines had had
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of its negligence in the
first action and decided that it had.
The second major decision allowing the offensive use of collateral
estoppel by a non-party against the previous defendant was Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Division.68 The case held that the
judicial interpretation of an employment contract in a suit by five employees was binding upon the employer in a subsequent suit by the remaining employees involving the same facts. The court's rationale for its holding
is interesting. The court said that the parties expected the initial suit
to be a test case and binding upon later suits, and that no surprise was
involved because the defendant knew that other plaintiffs were waiting
in the wings; therefore, the defendant had "litigated to the hilt" in the
66. Gurie, Mutuality of CollateralEstoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. REv. 281, 285 (1957).
67. United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev.
1962), aff'd sub nom., United Airlines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
68. 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
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first suit. This seems to engraft a foreseeability requirement onto the
"full and fair opportunity to litigate" standard. The court also noted
that the issue involved contract construction by a judge and not by a jury,
implying that a different result might be appropriate in the latter situation.
Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd.69 adds additional factors to consider in determining whether to allow a plea of
collateral estoppel. Once again an airline accident resulted in multiple
lawsuits, with the first trial in California resulting in a judgment for the
plaintiffs. The second suit was brought in New York and the California
judgment was pleaded as a conclusive determination of defendant's negligence. The court refused to give preclusive effect to the prior judgment,
despite the fact that the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the first trial. The court was influenced by the fact
that the verdict in the first trial was for $35,000, whereas the plaintiff
in the second suit sought $500,000 in damages. The defendant had not
appealed the small first verdict (which it may have considered to be a
victory of sorts). The defendant alleged that the small award of damages
was evidence that it was the result of a compromise verdict. The New
York court said that giving conclusive effect to the compromise verdict
in subsequent actions would force the defendant to appeal all verdicts,
even if it considered a small award of damages to be a victory in that
particular case. Other courts have also placed importance on evidence
of compromise verdicts in determining if it would be "unfair" to a defendant to bind him with a prior verdict. Thus, the court added a concept
of motive to litigate fully both at the trial and on appeal to the "full
and fair opportuntiy to litigate" standard.7 0
Another question raised in these situations is when a prior judgment
is "final" for purposes of collateral estoppel. The court in United Air
Lines held as a matter of federal law that a federal district court judgment
was "final" for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel, even if
the judgment is still on appeal. 7 ' In practice, however, some courts have
been hesitant to give conclusive effect to a prior judgment that is being
72
appealed.
The use of collateral estoppel by a non-party as a sword (offensively)
as well as a shield (defensively) may compel defendants to change trial
strategy, especially in multiple-claimant situations. Whereas defendants
at one time tried to separate plaintiffs and prevent class actions in order
to force each plaintiff to bear the high cost of litigation, they may now
prefer to have all potential plaintiffs join in one action, so that the
69. 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
70. Id. at 540.
71. 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962). See also Menedez v. Saks & Co., 485
F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973); Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F.
Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Sherman v. Jacobson, 247 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y.

1965).

72. See Fink v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Maryland v. Capital
Airlines, 267 F. Supp. 298 (D.C. Md. 1967).
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determination will be binding on the plaintiffs as well as the defendants. 78
Federal courts now seem to allow tort actions to be brought as class
actions, because of the possibility that the defendant will be collaterally
estopped by an adverse decision. 74 In addition, the growing acceptance
of the offensive use- of collateral estoppel is having an effect on class
actions in another way. In making the determination whether a class
action is appropriate,7 5 the Third Circuit has recently suggested that
the availability of the offensive use of collateral estoppel by non-parties
may mean that a class action is not "superior" to suits by individual
plaintiffs.7 6
V.

THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE,

THE ERIE DOCTRINE, AND CHOICE-OF-LAw QUESTIONS
If it is accepted that allowing a plea of a prior judgment by a nonparty to that judgment against a person who was a party thereto does
not violate due process, then each state is constitutionally free to decide
whether to retain or abandon the rule of mutuality in situations where
both actions arise in that state. However, where the prior judgment is
from a foreign jurisdiction, three additional problems are presented.

A. Full Faith and Credit
Does the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution require the
second court to accord the prior judgment the same, and only the same,
faith and credit it would have received in the state where the judgment
*was rendered? For example, assume that plaintiff is involved in a multivehicle collision involving vehicles from various states. Plaintiff sues
defendant A in State X, which requires mutuality. The jury in State X
by special verdict finds that plaintiff was contributorily negligent and
denies recovery. Plaintiff then sues defendant B in State Y, which has
abolished mutuality. Defendant B seeks to preclude the relitigation of
plaintiff's negligence by pleading the prior judgment. Plaintiff argues
that State X requires mutuality and would not allow the preclusion if
the second suit had been brought in State X; therefore, State Y is bound
by the full faith and credit clause to deny the preclusion plea.
I Interpretation of the full faith and credit clause usually arises when
there has been a failure to give sufficient effect to a prior judgment of
73. Schmidt v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 813, 816 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
74. See Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972);
Hernandez v. Motor Vessell Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Fla. 1973); American
Trading & Production Corp. v. Fischback & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412 (N.D.
Il. 1969). This has been allowed in spite of the advisory committee's note that
Federal Rule 23 was not devised for tort actions. In addition, section 1407 of
Title 28 provides for the consolidation and coordination of pretrial proceedings
in multi-district litigation.
75. See FED. R. Cnw. P. 23 (b) (3) (1976).
76. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974), cert denied,
419 U.S. 885 (1975).
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a sister state. 77 This differs from the problem. raised above which involves whether a subsequent court may grant "greater" effect to a sister
state's judgment by ignoring a limitation or disability the initial forum
attaches to its own judgments. The first cases presented with this situation

applied a literal mechanical rule78 to the congressional statute79 implementing the full faith and credit clause without examining whether the
purposes behind the clause were being served in the individual case. In
Board of Public Works v. Columbia College8 o the Supreme Court pro;pounded the mechanical rule, saying: "No greater effect can be given
to any judgment of a court of one State in another State than is given
to it in the State where rendered." 8' That case can be distinguished from
the above example because the Supreme Court was prohibiting giving
res judicata effect to a sister state's judgment that was not final under
the law of the rendering state. Challenging the finality of a foreign judgment may threaten the integrity of the rendering state's procedures. In
the above example, however, the forum state would merely be giving
greater effect to a judgment that is final in the rendering state, which
arguably does not threaten the rendering state's internal procedure.
An examination of the purposes behind the full faith and credit
clause would seem to be preferable to the mechanical rule in deciding
whether a state may give greater res judicata effect to a rendering state's
judgment than the rendering state would have given. Prior to the formation of our federal union, the American colonies were considered autono4
mous and free to disregard judgments of the other colonies and judgments
previously decided were subject to reexamination upon the merits when
sued upon for execution.8 2 When the federal union was established both
the Articles of Confederation 8 3 and later the Constitution,8 4 took steps
to prohibit this obvious source of trouble.
When the Supreme Court first considered the full faith and credit
clause,85 the Court stated that it-was designed' to insure that if a judgment is conclusive in the rendering state, it must control elsewhere; thus,
"lt
remains only then to inquire in every case what is the effect of a
77. Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S.
581 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).

78. See Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 521
(1873); Suydam v. Barber, 18 N.Y. 468 (1858).
79. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, supplemented by, Act of March 27,
1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298, 28 U.S.C. § 687 (1940), now 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970).

80. Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 521

(1873).

81. Id. at 529.
82, Costigan, The History of the Adoption of Section 1 of Article IV of the
United States Constitution and a Considerationof the Effect on Judgments of that
Section and of Federal Legislation, 4 COLUM. L. REv. 470 (1904).
83. Art. of Confed., Art. IV.
84. See M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. '(13 Peters) 169 (1839); U.S. CoNsr. art.
IV, § 1.
85. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 631 (1813).
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judgment in the State where it is rendered."8 6 The Court has declared
in other cases, however, that the purpose of the clause is to prevent a
repetition of proceedings that have already been adjudicated in another
forum.8 7 This purpose and the purposes behind res judicata and collateral
estoppel are thus fully compatable. The advancement of one would seem
to be the advancement of the other.
The Supreme Court has also recognized certain limitations on the
applicability of the full faith and credit clause by refusing to extend the
scope of the clause to state statutes or common law.88 The Supreme Court
of Nevada recently utilized this categorization8 9 to escape the full faith
and credit clause in order to apply its own rules of res judicata when
considering the effect to be given to a Florida judgment. One additional
argument sometimes made to limit the full faith and credit clause is that
the clause must give way to the interest of each state in controlling its
own affairs within its own borders.9 0 It is at least arguable, therefore,
that the full faith and credit clause does not forbid one state from giving
greater collateral estoppel effect to a sister state's judgment than the
rendering state would give.
A stronger argument for not allowing the full faith and credit clause
to govern this area may be presented if the example previously given is
reversed so that the first action is brought in State Y which has abolished
mutuality and the subsequent action is brought in State X which retains
mutuality. Will State X be required by the full faith and credit clause
to give State Y's judgment the same collateral estoppel effect in State X
that it would have received in State Y, thus ignoring its own requirement
of mutuality? The Supreme Court has suggested that the full faith and
credit clause would govern in such a situation as to res judicata. 91 It
is possible, however, to distinguish traditional res judicata from the use
of collateral estoppel by a non-party because jurisdictions that have abandoned mutuality do not allow issue preclusion on the basis of a mechanical
"one day in court is all you get" test, but rather on the basis of whether
the party to be precluded has had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue." This test seems highly discretionary with the trial judge and
as such, the foreign state may not be able to decide in all cases whether
the rendering state itself would have allowed the plea or not. Thus when
it is unclear what the collateral estoppel effect in the rendering state
86. Id. at 632.
87.
Halvey,
Co., 315
88.

Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 407 (1952); New York ex rel. Halvey v.
330 U.S. 610, 616 (1947) (concurring opinion); Riley v. New York Trust
U.S. 343, 348-49 (1942).
Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941); Pacific Em-

ployees Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). See also Wein-

traub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of
Law, 44 IowA L. Raw. 449 (1959).
89. Clark v. Clark, 80 Nev. 52, 389 P.2d 69 (1964).
90. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 (1933) (dissenting opinion).
91. Id. at 202.
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would be, presumably the forum state could apply its own rules requiring
mutuality and allow the issue to be relitigated.
If the full faith and credit clause is held to govern the collateral
estoppel effect to be given a foreign judgment, this might encourage "forum
shopping" and possible collusion in multi-state litigation as to which case
should first come to trial in order to gain maximum benefit from the
judgment.
B. The Erie Doctrine
The situation becomes even more complicated when either the rendering court or the forum court is a federal court. The Berner court stated,
without deciding, that the collateral estoppel effect to be given to a prior
federal court judgment in a subsequent action in either a federal or state
court might itself be a federal question and the same would hold true

for the collateral estoppel effect to be given to a prior judgment, either

state or federal, if the subsequent action was brought in a federal court.92
This implies that there is a body of "federal law" that governs collateral
estoppel in federal courts. It would seem, however, that in a diversity
case, the Erie doctrine93 would apply and the law of the state where the
federal court sits would govern.9 4 The idea of "federal law" governing
this area is important because the federal courts have shown a much greater
willingness to abolish mutuality than have the state courts. Once again

the practice of "forum shopping" will gain impetus if federal law governs
the collateral estoppel effects to be given to judgments in federal court,
especially since many federal courts sit in states that require mutuality.
C. Choice-of-Law
Assuming the full faith and credit clause does not require the forum
state to apply the law of the rendering jurisdiction as to the collateral
estoppel effects to be given to its judgment, a choice-of-law question
remains. If there is a conflict, should the forum state apply its own law
or defer to that of the rendering state?
The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts takes an unusually strong stand
on this issue: "What persons are bound by a valid judgment is determined,
subject to constitutional limitations, by the local law of the state where
the judgment was rendered." 95 If there is no constitutional prohibition
against the allowance of a plea of collateral estoppel by a non-party to
the prior judgment and the full faith and credit clause is not held applicable in determining the collateral estoppel effect that can be given to
92. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Inc., 346 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1965); Brown v. DeLayo, 498 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1974); Bricker v. Crane,
468 F.2d 1228 (Ist Cir. 1972); In re Air Crash Disaster, 350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D.
Ohio 1972); Comment, Res Judicata in the Federal Courts:Application of Federal
or State Law: Possible Differences Between the Two, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 96 (1965).
93. Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
94. See Brown v. Werner Co., 428 F.2d 375 (Ist Cir. 1970); Mackris v.
Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968); Gonzalez v. Fireman's Fund, Inc., 385 F.
Supp. 140 (D.P.R. 1974).
95. R TATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAw § 94 (1971).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 3
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

a prior judgment, this strong stand does not seem justified (except that
it is easy to apply). The purpose of this comment has been to illustrate
and discuss the analysis and balancing of factors that should be considered
prior to deciding whether to apply mutuality in an individual case. Each
time the issue is raised a careful investigation should be made to determine what benefits or prejudices would result from a decision to allow
or prevent the relitigation of an issue. It does not seem justifiable to let
the choice-of-law decision turn on such a rigid mechanical rule fostering
a "race to the courthouse" attitude.
Each state should consider its own interests and the interests of the
sister state involved concerning the effects of judgments. Considerations
should include which state the parties are from, how they would be treated
by their own state procedures, and which state will bear the burden of
relitigation or reap the benefit of preclusion.
VI. THE MISSouI PosMoN
Missouri courts have rarely been faced with the problem of a plea
of collateral estoppel by a person not a party to the prior action. Most
commentators list Missouri among those states that adhere to strict mutuality, citing Smith v. Preis.96 That case involved an interpleader action
by the defendant against the executrix of an estate. The executrix had
filed two separate lawsuits against the defendant, one for personal injuries
to the deceased and the other for wrongful death. To recover on both
claims the executrix would have to prove in the first that the injuries
caused by the defendant did not cause the deceased's death and in the
second action that such injuries did cause the deceased's death. The
defendant brought the interpleader suit to force the executrix to decide
which theory she would pursue. The case actually involved due process
and not mutuality, because the executrix in the first action represented
the estate and in the later action the heirs of the deceased. Thus her
presence in the two lawsuits would be in different legal capacities. The
determination of causation in the first action would not be binding on
the executrix in the later suit, because in her capacity as representative
of the heirs she was not a party to the first suit. Therefore, the case is
poor authority for saying that Missouri requires mutuality. Likewise,
the recent decision in 0. F_ L_ v. M_ R__ R.__ 7 speaks in terms
of collateral estoppel, but is actually a due process case involving what
constitutes privity in order to be bound by a prior adjudication, not the
issue whether a non-party may benefit from a prior adjudication.
In Taylor v. Sartorious9s the court allowed the defensive use of a
prior judgment against the plaintiff in the prior suit by a non-party to
the prior adjudication. The first suit was against one principal to a
contract. The central issue in this suit was whether an agent had authority
96. 396 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1965).
97. 518 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
98. 130 Mo. App. 23, 108 S.W. 1089 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908).
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to bind his multiple principals to the contract; the court held that he
did not. The plaintiff then brought a second suit against a different
principal based on the same contract. The court recognized that mutuality
was lacking, but also recognized that if the plaintiff was allowed to relitigate and won in the second action, the prior judgment in favor of the
first defendant would be worthless, because the second defendant had a
right of contribution against the first defendant. Rather than search for
ficticious privity to satisfy mutuality, the court reasoned that the purpose
of res judicata was to put an end to litigation and because the plaintiff
had had one fair trial, there was no reason to allow the relitigation. It
should be noted that this factual situation closely resembles the "indemnity
exceptions" to mutuality. 99
Similarly, in Arata v. Monsanto Chem. Co. 100 the court allowed the
defensive use of a prior judgment against the prior defendant. The first
action was a condemnation suit brought by the state in which Arata
raised the issue whether the taking was for public or private use, with
the finding that the taking was for public use. Arata then sued Monsanto
for damages for influencing the state to condemn his property. Monsanto
pleaded the prior adjudication and the defense was allowed.
The St. Louis District of the Missouri Court of Appeals recently
approved the defensive use of a prior judgment against a plaintiff who
was the plaintiff in the prior suit. In Gerhardt v. Miller'01 the plaintiffs

had first brought a will contest, but settled their claims and agreed not
to oppose probate of the will. The plaintiffs then brought a suit for
damages against the present defendants, alleging "duress, fraud, deceit,
manipulation, undue influence, and over persuasion" of the testatrix.
The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss the petition based on
res judicata and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals
acknowledged that mutuality was lacking, but stated that mutuality is
not required for the defensive use of a prior judgment, citing Arata. The
court decided that the ultimate issue whether the will was a product of
fraud had been decided in the prior will contest against the plaintiffs
by virtue of their agreement and that "it is the policy of the law to give
0 2
repose to litigated matters that have been properly concluded."'
Two recent Missouri cases seem to stand for the proposition that collateral estoppel may not be used offensively by a non-party. 03 In both cases a
husband sued a defendant for the loss of services of his wife. Each plaintiff attempted to plead the prior judgment in favor of the wife in her
action for personal injuries against the same defendant arising out of
the same transaction.' 0 4 In both cases the plea of collateral estoppel was
99 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
100. 351 S.W.2d 717 (Mo. 1961).
101. 532 S.W. 852 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
102. Id. at 855.
103. See Marusic v. Union Elec. Co., 377 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. 1964); Elmore v.
Illinois Term. R.R., 301 S.W.2d 44 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957).
104. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 66.01 (c) should prevent this issue from
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denied on the authority of Womach v. City of St. Joseph. 0 5 The reliance
on Womach seems misplaced. In Womach the wife lost her initial suit for
injuries, and her husband subsequently sued the defendant for loss of
services of the wife. The defendant pled the prior judgment against
the husband. Thus the issue in Womach was the due process consideration
of who may be bound by a judgment, not the issue of who may be benefitted by a judgment. The court in Womach, however, failed to make this
distinction and in denying the defendant's plea of res judicata against
the husband, the court felt compelled to overrule two earlier cases where
the offensive use of a prior judgment by a non-party had been allowed.100
Only one Missouri case, Estate of Laspy v. Laspy,10 7 has discussed
the Bernhard rationale. In Laspy, a widow filed a claim against the estate
of her husband for her statutory allowance. The estate defended on the
ground that the wife had been previously convicted of manslaughter of
her husband. In a well-reasoned decision the court noted that in the past
a prior criminal conviction had been inadmissible as evidence of the facts
determined in the criminal case, but also noted that all previous cases
involved a civil proceeding brought against the convicted defendant to
recover damages for the acts previously determined to have been criminal.
The court decided the same rule need not apply where the civil action
is brought by the convicted person for the purpose of profiting from
his criminal actions. The court noted the lack of mutuality, but determined that it was not necessary in this factual situation. The decision
contains an excellent discussion of Bernhard,but the court based its decision
on case law pertaining to evidence of criminal convictions, rather than
on collateral estoppel. The dicta of the case, although not speaking in
terms of defensive or offensive use, certainly implies that the Missouri
courts may allow a non-party to use a prior judgment defensively, but
not offensively.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a definite trend towards allowing the plea of a prior judgment by a non-party to that judgment to prevent one who was a party
from relitigating an issue previously decided. Courts faced with an everincreasing docket load will find it tempting to adopt such a doctrine in
order to eliminate the added cost and time involved in relitigating an
issue. However, the goal of judicial efficiency should never be allowed
to override the raison d'etre for the courts' existence-i.e., to do justice
between the parties. Just as the rigid requirement of mutuality was unfair
in certain circumstances, so would a rigid rule of no relitigation, as is
illustrated by United States v. Wexler.10 8 That case involved an action
arising in the future, because it compels joinder of a consortium claim with the
personal injury daim in most instances.
105. 201 Mo. 467, 100 S.W. 443 (1907).
106. Morris v. Kansas City, 117 Mo. App. 298, 92 S.W. 908 (1906); Brown v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 96 Mo. App. 164, 71 S.W. 1083 (1902).
107. 409 S.W.2d 725 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966).
108. 8 F.2d 880 (E.D.N.Y. 1925).
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to vacate a certificate of naturalization on the ground of Wexler's alleged
bad moral character. The court held that this bad character was conclusively established by a prior divorce action brought by Wexler's wife
on the ground of adultery. At the time of the divorce, however, adultery
was the only ground available for obtaining a divorce in the jurisdiction.
Most courts which have considered the mutuality issue have adopted
a case by case approach, using the "full and fair opportunity to litigate"
standard. This flexible approach is superior to either strict adherence
to the rule of mutuality or a rigid rule of no relitigation. However, this
approach also puts courts to the task of carefully evaluating all relevant
factors. Overlooking relevant factors can lead to very harsh and unfair
0 9 In Lustik the trustee of
results, as is illustrated by Lustik v. Rankila.1
an estate brought a suit for wrongful death against Lustik, arising out
of an automobile accident. Before trial Lustik filed suit for personal
injuries against the estate administrator, basing her claim on the same
accident. Consolidation of the two actions was denied and the trustee's
suit was given priority because it was filed first. Judgment was for the
trustee. When Lustik's suit came to the trial the administrator moved
for summary judgment claiming the issue of Lustik's negligence had been
decided in the first action. The trial court granted the summary judgment
and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. The dissent in Lustik points
out some of the problems involved. Minnesota has a statutory presumption" 0 of a decedent's due care in wrongful death actions and the jury
was so instructed. Lustik never had an opportunity to litigate her negligence or that of the decedent without confronting evidentiary rules
stacked against her by the statutory presumption. Also, Lustik based her
action on last dear chance (humanitarian negligence in Missouri). Thus,
she could have prevailed in spite of her contributory negligence. She was
precluded by the prior finding that the decendent was not negligent-a
finding that had the benefit of the statutory presumption. In the future
courts should certainly consider the impact of evidentiary rules such as
a Dead Man's Statute on the prior adjudication in deciding what constitutes a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in the prior adjudication.
If courts carefully examine the facts of each case, make an effort to
understand the policy considerations underlying the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, and avoid the temptation to rely on rigid rules of thumb and
out-moded distinctions, the goals of efficient use of judicial resources
and the opportunity to seek judicial vindication of one's rights can be
served equally well. Although precise standards are hard to apply, perhaps
the Supreme Court provided the answer when it said: "In the end, the
decision will necessarily rest on the trial court's sense of justice and
equity."
GARY R. CUNNINGHAM

109. 131 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. 1964).
110. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 602.04 (1957).
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